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ABSTRACT
by
Maria Jose Flor Ágreda
In Ecuador, media and politics have been historically tied together. Over time, the
banking industry has had financial stakes in the media and vice versa. Yet, from the time
that President Rafael Correa took office in 2007, the situation has been turned around.
Correa has used a permanent campaign to appeal to the public and change the media
ownership environment of the country. The President’s strategy has included the
acquisition of private media such as newspapers, and radio and television station; as well
as the establishment of governmental media entities. Additionally, as part of Correa’s
permanent campaign scheme, the president has used state-mandated time slots in all
public and private broadcasting channels — known as cadenas nacionales (national
chains) — to carry out his political agenda and to criticize the press and its coverage of
the government.
This has created a political rift between the public and private sector, giving way
to a media war. Through it, the media criticize the president and his policies, and the
president, in turn, verbally attacks the media. Due to that, national and international
media organizations have concluded that there is a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian
press.
This paper analyzed the content of opinion columns for one of the most important
privately owned newspapers in Ecuador, El Universo. The research analyzed the
negativity levels of the columns for three periods during the time that Correa has been in
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office, and showed increasing levels of negativity in them. Thus, the analysis lends
support to the argument that Correa’s public criticisms on the media have not created a
chilling effect.

KEYWORDS:
Ecuador; Rafael Correa; Permanent Campaigning; Press Freedom; Chilling Effect;
Media.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Media and Politics in Latin America
Given that mass media have significant political impact among a country’s
electorate, in Latin America, the mass media — mostly print and broadcast — (Rettberg
and Rincón 20) have been described as the fourth branch of government (Rettberg and
Rincón 2). Journalists and media corporations impart information upon the public and
through that, promote transparency among the political systems of various Latin
American countries. This means that, because of the information imparted to the public,
mass media have assumed the role of guardians of government (Rettberg and Rincón 2).
Yet, given that media are a business in need of survival, which are mostly owned
by private media corporations, they fall victim to economic competition. It is therefore
common for media to depict content that is sensationalized and appeals to the emotions of
consumers instead of reporting content that is important and in the public’s interest.
Hence, the coverage that media competition produces often causes cynicism and
alienation among the electorate of a country. This ultimately leads for people to begin to
distrust government and its entities (Rettberg and Rincón 2).
The purposes of educating the public through promoting governmental
accountability while at the same time having to compete for an audience in order to
economically survive are the root of a turbulent relationship that media have had with
political systems and governments in most Latin American countries (Rettberg and
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Rincón 4). This relationship raises questions regarding whether media are vital for
governmental functioning and the promotion of democratic values, an evil to be
combatted, or both (Rettberg and Rincón 3).
Do private media ownership and its interests affect a media entity’s news
coverage? Do mass media get used and abused by politicians, journalists, or owners of
media entities? Do media represent a contribution or an obstacle to democracy in a nation
(Rettberg and Rincón 1)? These are frequent questions that arise pertaining to the value
that media have in the politics of a country and the importance between governance and
the press.
It is widely understood that press freedoms are an important aspect of democracy
and civil liberties in a country (Rettberg and Rincón 21). Yet, through the use of
permanent campaigning — which comprises an aggressive method of “political
marketing … and the trend towards personality and image-based politics” (Sparrow and
Turner 985) — plebiscitary governments tend to advance an agenda that has the potential
to greatly silence an opposition (Rettberg and Rincón 2). Therefore, given that the
interests of private media owners tend to be incompatible with those of many country
executives, the media in such countries have become an inalienable type of opposition to
the governments of such countries (Santander 232).
This, in turn, leads for another conundrum. If privately owned media become the
opposition, then they tend to fight a constant battle with certain governments (Santander
231). Such governments, then, can fight back by restricting and censoring such media.
Therefore, if the battle between the media and political powers propagate in a country,
what happens to the country’s press freedom?
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Democracy and Press Freedom
Adherents to the concept of liberal democracy state that politics in any country
should look to establish a great degree of liberty for people, which includes the granting
of rights such as freedom of speech and the right of association, as well as providing a
governmental system that is supported by competition, participation, and contestation
(O’Neil 110). Hence, in a liberal democracy, people have the power to participate in
government through voting in elections and/or competing for public office — including
political party associations and the right to compete in fair elections (Danziger 75).
Scholars use the term “liberal democracy” to indicate a specific form of “political system
that promotes participation, competition, and liberty” (O’Neil 110).
Thus, it is typically understood that in a liberal democracy the media are “free to
publish whatever they want” (Rettberg and Rincón 21). In a country where liberal
democracy exists, the media are expected to freely criticize and even attack the
government with the “purpose of improving society” (Rettberg and Rincón 21). For this
to occur in a democratic manner, journalists and journalistic entities must be autonomous
in their decisions regarding coverage and criticisms of government.
Information about governmental actions, intrinsic to a society that promotes
democratic values, results in wider public participation (Rettberg and Rincón 3).
However, for the democratic values of such a society to thrive through the press, media
outlets need not focus on the political formation of the citizenry and instead focus on
providing useful information to the public. This means that for democracy to thrive
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through the press, the media must provide well-produced and unbiased information
(WANIFRA 6).
Yet, in some cases, the private interests of those who own media, often
compromise the democratic values that the press is set to promote (Rettberg and Rincón
3). Consequently, private media entities in Latin America have been known to corrode the
information passed along to the public. It is important to note that private media, which
have private interests in their coverage due to their dependency on advertising revenue,
can censor information much like a government in need of public approval is likely to
adapt information for the public’s eyes (Checa-Godoy 4).
Given the aforementioned conflicts of interest that privately owned media
constantly face, some governments in Latin America have pushed for the establishment
of a media system that is “socially responsible.” In such governments, media have the
“obligation to provide information and balance to society” (Rettberg and Rincón 21).
While this may not be considered to be a free system of media by the liberal democracy
standard — because media cannot simply publish anything they want — the
establishment of social responsibility among the media of a country allow for “the
construction of civil society” (Rettberg and Rincón 21).
Through the propagation of the idea of civil responsibility among media, some
governments in Latin America look to propagate balanced coverage and equal access to
media (Waisbord 97). Such government then create responsibilities for privately owned
media — voted or decreed into law — to have balanced and diverse content and inform
the public on the important issues of the day (Rettberg and Rincón 24). In fact,
“compared with the more spontaneous liberal model, the benefits of the social
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responsibility model in the press are clear” (Rettberg and Rincón 24) as they seek to
protect society. In a sense, the protection the state looks to guarantee relates to tasteless
content as well as information that “could generate panic or violence” (Rettberg and
Rincón 24). Hence, governments that want to establish a model of social responsibility
for the media, tend to want to institute a sort of national political consensus, brought
about by their concept of balanced coverage.
Even though the social responsibility model can be established in order to
guarantee fairer news coverage, private economic factors remain a dominant force when
it comes to news coverage (Punín Larrea 2). Given that private media have a necessity to
survive through advertising revenue, the press in countries with a social responsibility
model for media become subject to two types of censorship or control. These include
censorship from the state, which seeks to ensure balance in the coverage, and the
censorship that comes from the private interests of media owners (Rettberg and Rincón
2).
This leads to further issues, however, as the commercial and political elite, which
have ownership of media in most of Latin America, tend to “not act as guarantors of the
democratic order” (Checa-Godoy 3). Consequently, instead of being socially responsible
with coverage, media owners are likely to use media to protect their private financial
interests and those of their friends (Checa-Godoy 3). Hence, when private interests, and
not newsworthy coverage — stories that appeal to the public interest — are the driving
factors of media reportage, private ownership of media becomes a threat to press freedom
and to the spread of democratic values (Rettberg and Rincón 3). Additionally, all of those
who are against the interests of such private groups —which often include governments
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or certain governmental figures — become rivals of the media and are consequently
attacked by it (Waisbord 100).
In countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, such attacks to media
come from those governments’ permanent campaigning methods. A permanent campaign
can be described as the method to seamlessly join the “techniques of political
campaigning with the act of governing” (Conaghan and de la Torre 267). Thus, a
permanent campaign is the constant branding of a government in broadcast and print
media. In the aforementioned countries, governments’ permanent campaigning strategies
have prominently used national chains as a method of reaching out to people and
spreading their message to raise public approval for their political agenda. National
chains are “public service messages” (Conaghan and de la Torre 267) that are broadcasted
over a number of television and radio stations at the same time. Consequently, in such
governments, national chains have not only been use as a method of permanent
campaigning to raise public approval, but also, as a mechanism to openly criticize media
and its coverage in front of a country’s entire electorate.
This has led to a rise in conflict between leftist, populist countries in Latin
America and the privately owned media in such countries, giving birth to their
“oppositional polarization” or “media wars” (Kitzberger 5). These “media wars” —
between governments and media — are “fought openly in front of the public” (Kitzberger
5), becoming a prominent political feature among populist governments in Latin
America. Such fights make such governments seem as though they are constantly
fighting to restrain press freedom and democratic values — as understood by standards
related to liberal democracy (Kitzberger 6, 8).
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Purpose of the Study and Summary
This study looked at the permanent campaign style of Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa and his uses of media for the permanent campaign. With the understanding
that his permanent campaigning infringes upon normal news broadcasting and is often
used to target journalists and media outlets through constant public criticism (Ayala 7), I
analyzed the existence of a possible chilling effect. Through this, I attempted to grasp the
chilling effect that the permanent campaign in Ecuador, and Correa’s plebiscitary rule has
on privately owned media. In order to assess this, this study used content analysis to
analyze columns from a prominent, Ecuadorian privately owned newspaper, El Universo.
The columns were measured for levels of negativity to infer if the newspaper had press
freedom, represented by it printing increasingly negative columns about the government,
or if the newspaper is under a chilling effect, represented by an increase in positivity
regarding the government.
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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter integrates the scholarship pertinent to the areas of research relevant
to the proposed analysis. In order to complete this research it was important to explore
our current understanding of 1) what is a permanent campaign, how it works, and how it
is applicable in the case of Ecuador and its current President Rafael Correa; 2) what is
plebiscitary governance, how it affects politics and how it is relevant to current
Ecuadorian politics; and 3) the media situation in Ecuador with a recent historical
overview and its relationship to politics in the country. The combinations of these three
concepts comprise the foundation upon which this study is based — that the rising
plebiscitary governance of president Rafael Correa, which includes a permanent
campaign suggested to be partly used to attack private media in Ecuador, is likely to lead
to a decrease in press freedoms in the country by creating and inducting a chilling effect
among journalists and commentators of such media. Such a chilling effect, journalists
say, has the potential to cause “a reluctance to publish freely and pursue stories
aggressively” (Trager, Russomanno, and Dente Ross 134) out of fear of attack by the
government or legal repercussions by such, which can include lawsuits and/or
imprisonment.

The Permanent Campaign
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In December 1976, Patrick H. Caddell, a young pollster for the Jimmy Carter
presidential campaign, submitted a memo to the then-president-elect titled Initial Working
Paper on Political Strategy. The memo expanded on Caddell’s conclusions that
governing with public approval requires a continuing political campaign or a permanent
campaign. Caddell realized that media could have an enormous impact on public opinion
(Klein). This was a significant conclusion, as the American presidency had to constantly
appeal to its constituency to increase and maintain high levels of public support (Ornstein
and Mann 17).
The concept of the permanent campaign was also embraced by journalist Sidney
Blumenthal, who, in his book The Permanent Campaign, described the method of
governance as a perpetual method of promotion, which turns government into an
institution meant to maintain an elected official’s popularity (Blumenthal 11). In fact,
Blumenthal stated that the permanent campaign became a form of analyzing presidential
politics, and how country executives marry their techniques of political campaigning with
their act of governing in a seamless junction (Conaghan and de la Torre 267).
Therefore, through the wide-ranging concept that comprises the permanent
campaign, Americans, as well as people and politicians from other parts of the world,
have come to understand its importance. In fact, the permanent campaign has been
persistently used as an essential element in the act of governing (Conaghan and de la
Torre 269). This comes from the understanding that permanent campaigning occurs when
the “process of campaigning and the process of governing have each lost their
distinctiveness,” (Ornstein and Mann 219) and allows for a single process of
campaigning and governing.
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Hence, by combining political campaigning techniques with the act of governing,
the permanent campaign becomes indispensable in the analysis of the success of
presidential politics based on a politician’s popularity (Blumenthal 11). This leaves
politicians and candidates for public office in a continual campaign mode, always
working for public attention (Conaghan 47). Consequently, by joining political marketing
techniques with actual governance, politicians and elected officials can use the media for
the purpose of augmenting executive power, and increasing their popularity and
acceptance among the electorate (Conaghan and de la Torre 268). This makes the
permanent campaign an intrinsic aspect of modern politics, as through mass media,
political groups and candidates for office can take advantage of “attention grabbing
media events to communicate their causes directly to a mass audience” (Ornstein and
Mann 22).
Given that the most obvious and relatable description of the permanent campaign
is “campaigning and governing merging into one indiscriminate mass” (Ornstein and
Mann 1), it is important to note that the study of a permanent campaign is prevalent
because it directly affects people. In fact, a permanent campaign “is not the way the
electorate does politics, but rather, the way politics is done to the electorate” (Conaghan
and de la Torre 268), by politicians and political consultants. Permanent campaigning has
therefore become the only stable means of political involvement that most people
experience. This is mostly due to the fact that political marketing and its inescapability
take place in a perpetual manner, which allows politicians to obtain the vital public
support and approval needed for their political success (Ornstein and Mann 1-3).
This has turned the permanent campaign into more than a package of techniques
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used to promote presidential popularity. For instance, in some Latin American countries,
the permanent campaign has become an intrinsic practice that presidents and
governments use to “stay in power and to pursue political projects aimed at reconfiguring
power relations” (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). Nowadays, Latin American presidents
— especially those in the political “left” or “pink tide” — have become increasingly
concerned with their “public communication strategies … [and have established] media
practices intended for direct communication with larger publics” (Kitzberger 9).
Politicians in Latin America, especially populist ones — who form part of Latin
America’s political left turn — are aware of the importance of poll-driven and mediafocused election campaigns (de la Torre and Conaghan 337). This mindfulness goes
beyond the media’s usefulness in terms of elections, but also of its usefulness once a
politician is elected to office. For instance, given the necessity to connect with “the mass
public in unmediated ways and keeping presidential polling numbers high” (Conaghan
and de la Torre 269) has led for media-centric country executives to constantly seek to
mobilize public opinion even after being elected. Therefore, through a pervasive media
presence, such presidents “sought to mobilize public approval” (Conaghan and de la
Torre 269) so as to carry through with their political agenda.
The permanent campaigning strategy is then born through constant media
presence and is created in such a way that campaign consultants and media experts play a
significant role in influencing government and policy (Ornstein and Mann 219). By
turning the process of campaigning and the process of governing into an amalgamated
endeavor, the permanent campaign transforms governance into a “twenty-four hour
campaign cycle of pseudo-events for citizen consumption” (Ornstein and Mann 30). This
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way, the permanent campaign becomes the constant push to “connect the president
directly to voters, with minimal interfering or ‘filtering’” (Conaghan 53).
In the case of newly rising leftist, populist governments in Latin America,
presidents’ need to directly appeal to the public has risen from the area’s “acute crisis of
governability” (Conaghan and de la Torre 269). Due to this, newly elected leftist
governments have turned to practices that include “regular or sporadic presidential
broadcasts, travelling cabinets1, and the communicative instrumentalization of public
occasions or ceremonies” (Kitzberger 9). They have used such not only to spread their
political agenda among their electorate, but also to increase their popularity and approval.
Hence, given that presidents are in constant communication with their electorate, they
tend to reject practices such as press conferences and interviews with the press
(Kitzberger 9) as they provide information to the public through their own means.
Through the constant media presence presidents have in their countries, their
electorate is able to learn about national affairs and participate in the government’s
politics and political agenda. Sometimes, governments tend to use ulterior motives that
tell the people what they want to hear in a manner that furthers a politician’s cause
against his or her opposition (Ornstein and Mann 32). Consequently, elected officials are
able to manipulate public approval and even mobilize public opinion in ways that enable
them to govern without the necessity of congressional approval to implement new
policies (Conaghan and de la Torre 269). This is due to the fact that through an effective
permanent campaign, politicians can make their case and convince their electorate to

1

A travelling cabinet refers to when a president travels throughout his or her country and brings members
of his or her cabinet along so as to have a greater political presence.
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support their cause more easily than they would the legislature (Conaghan 47).
Additionally, in order to further their agenda with the public and spread their
political agenda to as many people as possible, “pink tide” presidents have resorted to
practices that “bypass and contest mainstream media journalism, which is deemed to be
dominated by media owners and therefore biased and distorting” (Kitzberger 9). Thus, to
further their permanent campaigns, presidents use mostly public media to disseminate
their message, or privately owned media that is “politically aligned” with the president’s
public agenda (Kitzberger 10). When presidents communicate with their electorate, their
messages are likely to contain criticism of media and journalistic coverage of
governmental issues with intention to “unveil and contest” (Kitzberger 9-10) such
coverage.
Arguably, the most important tools that Latin American governments use to
communicate directly with their electorate are cadenas nacionales or “national chains.”
Governments use national chains to “spread official messages about the different
functions of the State” (FUNDAMEDIOS 1). These messages are called chains because
they are “by law, broadcasted on all radio and television channels” (Cronista), causing a
chain effect as individuals cannot change the television or radio channels without running
into the government’s mandated broadcast. Given the laws of some countries, such as
Argentina, Ecuador, or Venezuela, laws state that national chains be broadcast on all
channels, including those that don’t publically support the government (Republic of
Argentina, Law 26.522, Article 75). Additionally, in some countries such as Ecuador,
laws state that “television stations are obliged to provide the government with free air
time for national public service broadcasts” (Conaghan and de la Torre 276).
13

Thus, through the permanent campaign, every message that is disseminated to the
public becomes a tactic to get votes or approval (Ornstein and Mann 17). Therefore, the
study and understanding of the permanent campaign and its possible effects on
democracy is important. This is due to the fact that, depending on how it is used,
permanent campaigning can increase hostility and recklessness in politics as it disregards
the fact that a country’s electorate can mistake political persuasions for reality (Ornstein
and Mann 4).
Yet, permanent campaigns, which target entire electorates and have the power to
reach people in remote areas through mass media, can be considered to be one of the
most democratic forms of governance and campaigning (Ornstein and Mann 233). This
can be understood as such given that permanent campaigns constantly bombard the
populace with propagandist information, making everyone who watches and/or listens to
the message, a potential participant in the process (Ornstein and Mann 125). Given that
elected officials can use mass media to get their message out to the public, governments
can sometimes take advantage of the varied resources such as broadcast and print media.
Thus, through such resources, governments can create permanent campaigning
environments that result in “uneven playing fields” for a country’s political opposition
(Conaghan and de la Torre 281).
While a permanent campaign might consist of democratic values in the sense that
it looks to appeal to the general public, it has the potential to turn a government into a
plebiscite (Lowi 97). A plebiscitary government is one that seeks public approval so that
the public constantly participates and, through referenda, passes legislation in favor of the
president (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). This renders a country’s legislation without
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actual power to legislate as the president can bypass it by making the people vote
legislation that abides by his or her agenda (Conaghan and de la Torre 268).
The permanent campaign has over time developed into a government’s new
approach of governance in the sense that “presidents seek to mobilize public opinion
directly in order to govern ‘over the heads of congress and the party leaders’” (Conaghan
and de la Torre 282). Hence, with the progressively overwhelming amount of public
support that a country’s executive is able to obtain through his or her permanent
campaigning, opposition parties run the risk of having weaker power in a country’s
legislation system (Lowi 195). This, in turn, allows for a president to stop his or her role
of “bargainer” with the country’s legislators, as he or she can easily opt to publically
appeal to the electorate and make a case for public support (Conaghan and de la Torre
260). Hence, as previously stated, through permanent campaigning, a country’s executive
can bypass a noncompliant legislature by simply appealing to the public.
If country executives use governmental resources to saturate their electorate with
messages through national chains and/or constant advertisements, media usage by the
opposition has the potential to become highly disproportionate to that of the
government’s (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). Thus, in governments where presidents
take advantage of their country’s media resources to suppress the political power of their
opposition, a permanent campaign can be regarded as a “potential minefield for
democratic politics” (Conaghan and de la Torre 282).
Given that democracy promotes equalized governmental participation and
competition (Danziger 75), the fact that in some countries, permanent campaigning has
the potential to transform politics to enhance the power of the governing president or
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political party, can be construed as antidemocratic (Tenpas and McCan 350). As
permanent campaigns are enhanced by a government’s regulatory policies, presidents can
implement restrictive campaign laws that limit or prohibit the use of public resources for
political purposes while using them limitlessly to further their political agenda (Conaghan
and de la Torre 281). Through this, governments can block the opposition from exposing
its views to the electorate through the media.
The uneven playing field turns a permanent campaign into something far more
than a technique for maintaining or obtaining public support, but instead, a method of
silencing the opposition. Silencing the opposition becomes increasingly vital to
presidents and governments in order to remain in power (Conaghan and de la Torre 281).
Consequently, in such cases, a permanent campaign is not a promoter of equal
participation. Instead, the permanent campaign has polarizing effects in the politics of a
country and promotes inconsistency in its governance as the incumbent president has a
disproportionate advantage over his or her opposition (Charnock 18).
Although the permanent campaign is a concept coined by American strategists,
given the internationalization of American electioneering, in places such as Latin
America, the rise of an extreme form of a permanent campaigning has the potential to
turn government figures into avid permanent campaigners (Conaghan and de la Torre
269). As previously stated, such governments have developed to constantly focus on
appealing to the public, instead of legislators (Conaghan and de la Torre 268).
Much like their American counterparts, Latin American presidents confront
factionalized and unpredictable legislations and unmanageable party coalitions (de la
Torre and Conaghan 339). Therefore, the use of unmediated ways of connecting with the
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electorate become vitally necessary to keep a country’s executive’s support numbers high
and become “normal tools of the trade,” (Conaghan and de la Torre 261). In this manner,
country presidents become media-centric, realizing that outreach through media is a key
“strategy aimed at highlighting their personal attributes” (de la Torre and Conaghan 347)
and political agenda.
As much as high acceptance among the electorate and high public approval
priority for most Latin American countries, those in the Andean region have stood out as
countries with extreme forms of permanent campaigning that have led to extreme
plebiscitary governments (Conaghan 47). Over the last decade, in countries such as
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, plebiscitary governments have risen out of acute crises
of governability, which have led the institution of the presidency of those countries to
become highly plebiscitary (Conaghan and de la Torre 269).
In fact, the plebiscitary governance, a direct result of the permanent campaign,
has become a new development for Ecuadorian politics as the country has gone through
“multiple dysfunctions associated with the party system and its leadership,” (Conaghan,
48). Throughout Ecuador’s recent history, especially from the transition out of military
rule in 1979, the country has experienced one of the highest indexes in party
fragmentation in Latin America as well as electoral volatility (de la Torre and Conaghan
339). In fact, the executive, legislative and court system of the country have been long
described as innate and corrupt, where governance and legislation were made as measure
of contracts with the purpose of carrying out the private endeavors of those who
participated in them. Additionally, the political situation in Ecuador was volatile as the

17

ten years prior to 2006; three presidents had been unable to complete their four-year
terms (Conaghan 48) and were thrown out of office.
In order to maintain power and support from the electorate, Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa Delgado — who won the 2006 presidential election and took office in
2007 — has followed in the footsteps of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and
Bolivian President Evo Morales, in launching a campaign that mobilizes public opinion
not only to “win battles with congress, but to launch projects aimed at ‘re-founding’ their
respective republics,” (Conaghan & de la Torre, 269). Though this, Correa took office
with an agenda that was heavily dependent on public approval. If he was able to obtain
the approval he needed from the electorate, then he and his political party, Alianza PAÍS Patria Altiva I Soberana, PAÍS Alliance - Proud and Sovereign Fatherland (Conaghan
47) could gain majority power. Successive winning of important electoral contests, which
included referenda, constituent assembly elections, and a succeeding round of
presidential elections (Conaghan & de la Torre, 269), became crucial to Correa’s success.
Hence, he and his government established a permanent campaign to accomplish such
goals.
Therefore, as Correa assumed office during a politically unstable time in Ecuador,
he came into power with the full knowledge that he had to re-make the political system in
the country through a “series of rapid-fire electoral events” (Conaghan & de la Torre,
269). This allowed him to restructure and change the country’s constitution, grant the
post of the executive more power, and reorganize the country’s party system to suit his
and his party’s political agenda (Conaghan 47).
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As previously stated, in the decade before Correa became president of Ecuador,
the country was one of the most insecure democracies in Latin America. From 1997 to
2005, the Ecuadorian public had forced three elected presidents: Abdalá Bucaram, Jamil
Mahuad and Lucio Gutiérrez, out of office, before each was able to complete his fouryear term (de la Torre and Conaghan 339).2 This type of political precariousness, defined
as “presidents interrupted” (de la Torre and Conaghan 340) made Correa supremely
aware of the instability his office once sworn in as president. This was especially true
given that mass public protests against an executive’s economic policies or corruptive
manners had been responsible for the removal of Ecuador’s thee previous presidents from
office, mostly “with the tacit approval of the armed forces” (Conaghan and de la Torre
271).
Consequently, it was important for Correa to take into account the unstable
political situation in Ecuador when he took over the presidency so that he and his
government could create an effective permanent campaign (Conaghan and de la Torre
271). Such an effective campaign would help Correa not only remain in power, but also
obtain high public approval levels. This was critical at the time, as power and approval
were something that politicians from all parties, including governmental entities, lacked
(Conaghan and de la Torre 271).
When Correa began his campaign for the presidency in 2006, he did so as an
outsider to the Ecuadorian political arena (Conaghan and de la Torre 271). In fact, before
his presidential campaign, he had never run for public office and the only political post he
had held was a just-over-100-days position as Minister of Economy to which he was
2

Ecuadorian presidents are elected to four-year terms with the contingency to run for reelection to another
four years. They have a limit of two terms.
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appointed to by interim president Alfredo Palacio in 2005 (de la Torre and Conaghan
339) — Correa’s training as an economist, holding a doctorate from the University of
Illinois helped him get appointed to the position (de la Torre and Conaghan 340). Yet, his
swift tenure as minister of economy assured him an “image as a maverick and a virulent
critic of neoliberal economic policies3” (Conaghan and de la Torre 271).
Thus, Correa’s image allowed him to quickly form a political party and use it as a
vehicle to run for the presidency in 2006. Even though Correa’s newly formed political
party enticed many people who belong to leftist movements — especially those that had
been instrumental in the removal of President Lucio Gutierrez from office in 2005
(Conaghan 49) — the fragmented nature of Ecuadorian political parties indicated that
Correa, even if elected, would have a hard time getting candidates elected as members of
the incoming congress (Conaghan 50). Therefore, with the knowledge that it would be
near impossible for him to obtain congressional support for his policies, “Correa decided
to run against the system itself” (Conaghan and de la Torre 271) by not having anybody
from his political party run for Congress.
During his campaign to the presidency, Correa promised Ecuadorians that he
would sign an executive decree that authorizing for the country to carry out a referendum
enabling for the creation of a constituent assembly — an ad-hoc legislative group that
would serve the purpose of drafting a new constitution (del la Torre and Conaghan 339).
The new constituent assembly became the backbone of Correa’s discourse as he promised

3

In terms of economic policy, neoliberalism refers to the idea that “cooperation can create great benefits
through trade” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 87). Thus, economic neoliberal policies require opening of
trade markets, support for private sectors and reduction of the role of government in a country’s
industry (Smith 14). The basis of neoliberal economic policies assume that countries are unlikely to
restrict open markets and trade for fear of retaliation such as the placement of high tariffs on their
exporting goods (Goldstein and Pevehouse 87).
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that it would help end the country’s long history of “a partyarchy” (Conaghan and de la
Torre (271) — a form of political party bureaucracy in which the strongest and most
influential political parties effectively assume sovereign power in a state.
Given that initially, no individual from his political party ran for congress, when
Correa took office he “immediately faced the consequences of having ceded congress to
his political rivals” (Conaghan and de la Torre 273). Because of this, he needed
immediate public support not only to remake the legislative system by switching it from a
bicameral to a unicameral congress. Additionally, he needed public approval to conduct a
referendum proposed during his campaign and support to have it passed so that he could
“enjoy complete control over the writing of the new constitution” (Conaghan and de la
Torre 274).
Through his permanent campaign, which included strong advertising for approval
of the constituent assembly, Correa was able to obtain support from “82 percent of the
electorate” (Conaghan and de la Torre 273) for the constitutional assembly, ensuring his
party control over the writing of the new constitution with 80 of the 130 seats available.
In order to maintain his popularity and his achievements present in the minds of
Ecuadorians, Correa and his communications team established a weekly radio show —
this is due to the fact that radio had proven intrinsic to the presidential campaign in 2006
(Conaghan and de la Torre 275). Correa inaugurated a weekly radio program called The
President Dialogues with his Constituents. The two-hour program was broadcasted every
Saturday on 154 radio stations throughout the country (Conaghan 53). — The program
went on to be broadcasted on radio and television under the title of Enlace Ciudadano
(Citizen Liaison). — The weekly shows provided (and continue to do so) an outlet for
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Correa to boast about his accomplishments as president and a forum to admonish his
opposition (Conaghan & de la Torre 53).
This gave the president a weekly platform to “publicize his government’s
accomplishments and lambaste his opponents” (Conaghan and de la Torre 275).
Additionally, such broadcasts have been continuously held throughout the country,
providing the president and members of his cabinet with a chance to meet constituents in
diverse locales, allowing the president “fertile ground for politicking” (Conaghan & de la
Torre 53). Thus, when the president and his ministers travel to different towns in the
country to broadcast his radio show, it creates a “direct political impact on the places that
the president visits” (Conaghan and de la Torre 275).
Additionally, given that the country could take advantage of free airtime for
broadcasts related to public interests, Correa’s government also began to use national
chains in television. The Correa administration has described national chains to be a tool
that chronicles “the administration’s latest accomplishments, with President Correa
figuring prominently in each installment” (Conaghan and de la Torre 276).
Yet, the government has shown that is uses national chains excessively and
“resorts to using these special announcements, normally reserved for the used in cases of
emergency to warn or inform the public” (WANIFRA 5) and to push its political agenda.
Such chains have, on average, lasted from three to 15 minutes (FUNDAMEDIOS 4) and
used as weekly, primetime “newsreels that chronicled the administration’s latest
accomplishments” (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). Even though these presidential
addresses have only lasted a few minutes each, the president has used them not only to
speak about the progress of his government, but also to “respond to criticisms in a
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particularly aggressive fashion, by discrediting, abusing and insulting his critics”
(WANIFRA 4).
In order to maintain his power in office and continue on with electoral victories,
Correa and his communications team have maintained a constant, perpetual campaign by
using the country’s media. National mandated chains have been used in increments from
the time Correa first became president, and as a form of permanent campaign have served
to boost the president’s popularity (Ornstein and Mann 112).
FUNDAMEDIOS — Fundación Andina para la Observación y Estudio de
Medios (Andean Foundation for the Observation and Study of Media) — a
multidisciplinary group formed in 2006 with the means to “protect the rights and
freedoms of expression, press, access to information and association” (FUNDAMEDIOS
4) stated that the usage of national chains is the most powerful tool the government of
Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa uses to impart the agenda of Correa’s Citizen
Revolution. The foundation’s Special Report on the usage of Governmental Media Uso
de cadenas nacionales: ¿Herramienta para contrarrestar la opinión disidente? (Usage of
national chains: a tool for offsetting dissenting opinions)? published in November 2012,
states that from 2010 to 2012, the Ecuadorian government used 138 national chains on
more than 200 television and radio stations free of charge. The 138 national chains
accounted for 1.464 minutes of broadcasting. Out of these, 137 chains, amounting to a
total of 1,029 minutes, included messages of “general interest,” which according to
FUNDAMEDIOS’ report, are used to “polemicize” against the governments opposition.
On some occasions, Correa used the slots to address the public directly, letting loose with

23

attacks on opponents. On other occasions the slots were used for “negative advertising
targeting critics” (Conaghan, de la Torre, 276).
Additionally, FUNDAMEDIOS stated that at the top of Correa’s list of his
opposition are media and press personalities, whom he has branded as “la prensa
corrupta,” (the corrupt press), cosely followed by political opposition in government and
those who have dissenting opinions from that of the government’s ideology and actions.
Therefore, given the media landscape of the country, privately owned media have
come to be part of the opposition forces in Ecuador regularly criticized during the chains.
The FUNDAMEDIOS’ report stated that from the 1,364 national chains that have been
mandated by the government of Rafael Correa, 46 have been reported to the Foundation
as having been used to attack media or journalists (including political opposition
personalities).
FUNDAMEDIOS stated that among the chains (which are proven to have
increased over time) that Correa used, in part, to attack journalists, Correa used phrases
such as ¿Es esto un periodismo imparcial, independiente? — Is this impartial and
independent journalism? ¿Hasta cuándo? — Until when? Por esto es que Piero alguna
vez cantó…: “Y todos los días, todos los dias, los diarios publican porquerías.” Y Victor
Heredia, ante tanta infamia, lo reafirmó diciendo: “Y ese miento miente, que forma de
mentir.” — That’s why Piero once stated: “And everyday, every single day, newspapers
publish rubbish,” and Victor Heredia, facing such infamy, reaffirmed it by saying: “And
they lie, lie, what a form of lying.”
According to journalists and media entities such as FUNDAMEDIOS, comments
such as the above, made by the president, set a precedent for a chilling effect.
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Correa’s Plebiscitary Governance
A plebiscitary governance is understood as a “way in which presidents can use
direct, unmediated appeals to public opinion in order to govern ‘over the heads of other
institutions, especially legislatures” (Conaghan 47). This is especially true as “political
leaders have become ever more attentive to and sophisticated in gauging public opinion”
(Ornstein and Mann 32), which in turn, develops a permanent campaign doctrine and
pushes “unceasing forays for public approval” (Blumenthal 8). Thus, the permanent
campaign results in a plebiscitary form of government, as without public approval,
country executives would not be likely to carry out their political agendas (Blumenthal
39).
As previously mentioned, given that Chávez, Morales and Correa, who represent
Latin America’s “Left Turn” — a more “open-minded, reformist and internationalist”
(Castañeda 29) left — and the so called “twenty-first-century socialism” — an economic
model that “explicitly rejects the Soviet model of socialism, seeing it not only as
dictatorial and ultimately an economic failure but also rooted in a historical context that is
no longer relevant” (Kennemore and Weeks 1) — they have used the permanent
campaign strategy to appeal to their electorate. In fact, through their permanent
campaign, such presidents have been able to effectively push aside their opposition so as
to carry out their leftist transformations (Conaghan 48).
It is important to note that although permanent campaigns by Latin America’s new
left governments have created a plebiscitary form of governing that was effective in
undermining opposition in congress, “they did so in a fashion that ensured a fair share of
domestic and international legitimacy for the process” (Conaghan & de la Torre 269).
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Recurring electoral validation has been the cornerstone or Correa and Chávez’s
governments, as it allowed them to carry out the presidents’ promised mandate
(Conaghan & de la Torre 270). Hence, the permanent campaign and its plebiscite, have
become the driving feature of how both of the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments
function (Ellner 99).
After being elected president in 2006, Correa’s post-election communications
strategy was aimed at remaking Ecuadorian political elections through serial elections
and a high percentage of public support, winning such elections became the “primary
objective of the new administration; thus, the permanent campaign was born out of
necessity and directed as a larger scheme of political transformation” (Conaghan and de
la Torre 280). Therefore, given the president’s push for electoral and governmental
reform, he needed public support in order to call for a constituent assembly that would
change the constitution of the country, and thereafter, change the legislative system in the
country (Conaghan and de la Torre 270).
After winning the presidency, Correa needed a strategy to appeal to the
Ecuadorian electorate and their demands. Thus, in order to be “perceived by the
electorate as the leader who provides the only access door to a quota of power and
satisfaction to the people’s needs” (Ayala 8), he needed to do so through the media. After
winning his first election, Correa stated even though he had won the presidential election,
given the political factions of other parties within the Ecuadorian National Congress, he
had not won power (Conaghan 47). He recognized that the “power” within the
Ecuadorian congress was “controlled by economic interests, the banks, the partyarchy
and the media connected to the banks” (Conaghan 47).
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Consequently, in order to change the power structure in the country, vital to the
continuance of Correa’s political agenda, the president tied his governance of the country
to the consecutive success in elections (Conaghan 47). These elections included the
approval of the constitutional assembly and filling the seats with members of his party
(Conaghan and de la Torre 279), and another presidential election success in 2009 after
passing the new constitution, and another in 2013 for his second term in office after the
passing of the constitution.
This meant that Correa needed to mobilize public opinion effectively in order to
maintain his position as President of Ecuador. To obtain wide approval, he orchestrated a
permanent campaign through media to further his agenda as well as to disorganize and
defame his political opposition. This, in turn, caused an “extreme version of the
plebiscitary presidency” (Conaghan 47). Through his constant campaigning, Correa was
able to garner enough public support to bypass the National Congress and turn it into an
irrelevant institution. This turned the post of the president into a very powerful position
“[closing] the book on a decade of political instability” (Conaghan 48) in the country.
Yet, Correa’s plebiscite — a direct result of his permanent campaign (Ellner 99)
— while ubiquitous, may have had a negative impact in the advancement of Ecuadorian
democracy (Conaghan and de la Torre 282). Correa’s media campaign used a variety of
resources afforded to him by the presidency, which included the ability for Correa to
spread his message with minimal filtering from media outlets (Conaghan 53). Thus, it can
be argued that by constantly seeking public approval to govern over the country’s
legislature, Correa may have furthered political polarization and decreased his
government’s accountability (Santander 234).

27

Throughout his tenure as Ecuadorian president, Correa has been effective in using
the media to appeal to the Ecuadorian electorate (Conaghan 51). In fact, he understood
the necessity of the usage of his position as the Ecuadorian Executive to shape “public
opinion and [advance] his agenda for the constitutional assembly,” (Conaghan 52). He
has also used public opinion polls effectively, as well as media and communication
resources available to the presidency to “disorient, demoralize, and disorganize political
opponents” (Conaghan 47).
Given his skill in public relations, Correa became the “great communicator …
who skillfully conveyed popular, commonsense messages by means of a persona that
appeals to a wide spectrum of the public” (Conaghan 53). In order to maintain a high
percentage of public support among the electorate, Correa’s communications strategy has
used a perpetual media advertising campaign to keep the public firmly aligned with him
and his government (Conaghan and de la Torre 274). Correa’s constant appeal to the
hearts and minds of the Ecuadorian electorate not only allowed him to completely bypass
and render the country’s 100 member National Congress obsolete, but it also garnered
him the political stability that had been vacant for over a decade in the South American
country (Conaghan 53).
From the beginning of his presidency, much like Chavez and Morales, Correa
compiled a media campaign strategy formulated from inside the presidential palace4 that
included the efficient control of its communications secretariat (Recalde 21). Correa’s
team was well aware that “the antagonists of the electoral campaign would return” (del

4

Ecuador’s seat of government is referred to as the Palace of Carondelet (Palacio de
Carondelet).
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Torre Arauz 5) and try to undermine his office as the executive and deter him from
accomplishing his plans.
The entire media operation used to propagate Correa and his agenda to popularity
was synchronized by the country’s Secretariat of Communication and expedited from the
presidential palace (Conaghan and de la Torre 275). The communication strategy, much
like his campaign strategy, included television and radio as the main instruments for
spreading the president’s message (Freidenberg 137).
Additionally, the communications strategy consisted of ubiquitous advertisements
on radio and television on behalf of Alianza PAÍS, which cost the government an
estimated $6.938 million (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). The actual value of the
advertisements was $16.7 million, but Correa was able to obtain discounts of as much as
60 percent for being the Ecuadorian President (Conaghan and de la Torre 276).
During his communications campaign, Correa passed legislation that prohibited
political parties and their candidates to the National Assembly to use any governmental
broadcasting slots and prohibited the private purchase of broadcasting time slots
(Conaghan and de la Torre 278). Correa and his administration stated that this measure
was meant to prevent wealthy parties and candidates from having an unfair advantage in
terms of securing airtime (Conaghan and de la Torre 277). Moreover, Correa took to
publicly attacking newspapers and journalists who criticized the executive’s dubious
usage of public resources (Punín Larrea 12).
Through the permanent campaign that Correa developed from the time he became
president of Ecuador, he has been able to garner a great deal of public support (Ayala 9).
This, in turn, has allowed for him and his political party to rule over the heads of the
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Ecuadorian legislative system. Correa is certain that his government’s permanent
campaigning efforts have allowed him a high percentage of public support (Conaghan
and de la Torre 273). With such, he acted with security and firmness in granting his office
more power. That way, he has been able establish his political agenda not only through
his influence in the legislative system, but also in the judicial (Ayala 10).

Media situation in Ecuador
By the year 2000, Ecuador and its media were considered to be one of the most
corrupt in Latin America (Conaghan and de la Torre 271). As stated in previous sections,
from the 1990s to the mid 2000s, the country underwent a period of high political
instability. In fact, three of Ecuador’s democratically elected presidents were overthrown
and “half a dozen coups or attempts occurred” (Checa-Godoy 3) during that time. This
led to a deep economic crisis in the South American country and a banking crisis from the
year 1999-2000, which “highlighted the deep links between the country’s financial power
and the country’s major media” (Checa-Godoy 3).
The crisis shed light on the fact that even though Ecuador had not had major
issues relating to the oppression of press freedom, banks’ ownership of media indicated
that media were not reporting important issues (WANIFRA 1). In fact television stations
and newspapers were used to further the financial interests of the banks that owned them
and purposefully hid “the imminent arrival of the crisis” (WANIFRA 1).
The lack of reporting of Filanbanco and Banco del Progreso’s — two of the most
important banks in Ecuador in the 1990s — financial issues points to the assertion that
the media in the country backed the interests of the “commercial and political elite,”
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(Checa-Godoy 3). Additionally, the lack of coverage points to the fact that the media did
not fulfill their purpose of informing the public fairly on a variety of issues in the public’s
interest (WANIFRA 1). Moreover, the banking crisis resulted in an economic recession,
which lead to the decline in newspaper readership in Ecuador (Checa-Godoy 2). Not until
2009, did newspaper readership pick up to 900,000 daily copies with the most sold
newspaper in the country being El Universo, from Guayaquil (Checa-Godoy 8).
Given the deep ties between the banking system in Ecuador and its ownership in
the media, and media ownership in banks, the 1999-2000 banking crisis brought about a
loss of credibility in the privately owned media. Additionally, it showed that journalists
who worked for such media “clearly followed the interests of their perspective groups”
(Checa-Godoy 6). Thus, Correa has been able to capitalize on the situation by publicly
“connecting media elites to the discredited banking institutions and political actors”
(Kitzberger 14) in the country. In fact, Correa’s discourse against privately owned media
and coverage practices served to shape “his path to the presidency as a political outsider”
(Kitzberger 19). Correa’s discourse, which rejected economic neoliberal policies and
Ecuador’s political powers, catapulted him to popularity, turning Correa into a “strong
political authority” (Kitzberger 19).
The Ecuadorian President has stated that the private press in the country has been
historically immoral and failed the public by not providing information that is in the
public interest (Kitzberger 20). Correa has stated that “private business providing a public
good,” (Kitzberger 20) is a contradictory concept that endangers democracy through
media in the country. Therefore, it was the government’s duty to unmask the media and
provide varied options for news coverage — state sponsored or owned — for the
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Ecuadorian public (Checa-Godoy 16). The creation of state-controlled media was put
forward as a method to cope with the private media sector and increase “community
media-fostering policies” (Kitzberger 11). According to the president, the newly created
governmental media in the country “are not the government’s media” (Kitzberger 21) but
belong to the Ecuadorian people. Additionally, Correa has stated that the public media are
a positive aspect of a growing democracy, as “they do not have the deep dilemma
between the pocketbook and social compromise in communicating objectively”
(Kitzberger 21).
In addition to the creation of public media, given that the privately owned media
in the country was tied to private economic interests, the Ecuadorian Government
increased media regulations (Conaghan and de la Torre 277). According to the ideology
of the Ecuadorian government, these regulations were put forward not to hinder the
private media’s ability to reach an audience, but to democratize the media system in the
country and change the historical dynamics of media ownership (Checa-Godoy 16). This
included governmental media expansion and ownership of television and radio stations,
as well as newspapers (Punín Larrea 8).
In order to deal with issues of private-media ownership and market concentration
of media (Kitzberger 11), Correa has looked to “alter the ownership relations in the media
sphere” (Kitzberger 21). During the first year of Correa’s government, Correa took
advantage of his initial popularity and public support to reverse operating licenses on
some radio and television stations. Later in his tenure as president, Correa used the newly
established constitution to ban media monopolies in the country (Kitzberger 21).
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Unlike newspapers, however, radio has maintained its audience from before the
banking crisis and “continues to be a key industry in the Ecuadorian media” (ChecaGodoy 8), covering the whole country and broadcasted in both Spanish and Quechua —
the main indigenous language in the country. Radio is widely popular in the country and
has historically provided educational components apart from informational and
entertainment content. It was estimated in 2004 that “287 medium wave radio stations
and 487 FM stations” (Checa-Godoy 10), existed in the country. Additionally, the
Catholic Church has maintained a major presence in radio as the Conference of Bishops
in the country has ownership of approximately 15 stations among the major cities of the
country.
Television is another powerful medium in the country, but has been historically
monopolized by five channels that date back to the 1960s and 1970s and include
Ecuavisa, Teleamazonas, Gamavisión, TC Televisión, and Telecentro (Checa-Godoy 10).
These channels, although prevalent, have traditionally broadcasted frivolous content. As
much as television has remained a powerful medium in country, there has been no public
ownership of television stations until 2008, where Ecuador gained Gama Television
(Gamavisión), and TC Televisión “after their owners failed to pay their debts to the State
after the banking crisis” (Checa-Godoy 12). Additionally, in 2006 TeleSUR, “the interAmerican channel supported by Venezuela, had coverage in most of the country,”
(Checa-Godoy 12) and in 2008 the Ecuadorian State established a national channel,
Ecuador TV. The variety of channels has caused for the Ecuadorian audience to be
divided. Currently, there is not one channel that garners “more that 20 percent of the
audience share “(Checa-Godoy 12).

33

Correa has used attacks against the media through his permanent campaign
throughout his presidency. Yet, that is not the only way he has been able to hurt the
media. In fact, Correa and his government have gone as far as legally persecuting
newspapers and media entities for reasons such as defamation. In fact two of the major
cases, El Universo and El Gran Hermano, have been deemed by journalists as a direct
attempt from the government to silence journalists (Punín Larrea 4). Given that Correa
has stated “it is one thing to express an opinion, and quite another to speak with certainty,
make allegations and defame someone” (WANIFRA 6), legal cases against media entities
are described as milestones to change society.
The case for El Universo took place after Emilio Palacio wrote a column titled
“No a las Mentiras” (“No to lies”) was published (WANIFRA 7). President Rafael Correa
sued the writer of the column and the newspaper for defamation. In 2011, the justice
system sentenced Palacio and two owners of the paper to three years in prison and having
to pay $40 million in damages to the President for the crime of “insulting the mandatary”
(Ayala 4). Correa eventually pardoned the newspaper and Palacio and did not seek
monetary compensation (WANIFRA 7).
The case for El Gran Hermano took place after journalists Juan Carlos Calderón
and Cristhian Zurita published a book by the tile “El Gran Hermano” (“The Great
Brother”). In this book, the authors chronicled how the President’s brother, Fabricio
Correa, obtained government contracts worth millions of dollars (WANIFRA 7). Correa
has asked for $10 million in compensation for moral damages from both journalists
(Ayala 6)
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Furthermore, in 2009, Correa signed a decree into law prohibiting that the private
media sector in the country have contracts outside of the country (Ayala 4). Thus, media
entities such as El Comercio, El Universo, La Hora (main newspapers in Ecuador) and
Vanguardia Magazine, which had at least 19 percent participation in the Caribbean Virgin
Islands, United States, Panama, the Caiman Islands, the Bahamas and the United
Kingdom (Ayala 4).
In addition to media entities having to give up their foreign investments and
assets, they had to deal with the government cutting on its advertising with such entities.
In fact, through the new constitution, passed due to the president’s plebiscite in 2008, the
country experienced “gradual cuts to the participation of the financial powers in the
media” (Checa-Godoy 13). In fact, the constitution established that the financial sector
could not have “total or partial stakes in companies operating outside the financial
activity” (Checa-Godoy 13). This resulted in financial entities being secluded from any
type of financial relationship with the media in the country.
Not only did the constitution allow for a decrease in financial influence on private
media, but also for the rights of government to establish a state media sector (ChecaGodoy 13). In fact, throughout Correa’s presidency, the Ecuadorian Government has
“managed to agglutinate and convert a series of mass media into a strange figure called
‘public media’” (Punín Larrea 7). During Correa’s presidency, the government “has
seized some media entities and created others” (Vázquez and Saltos 332). Refer to
appendix.
The media seized by the government comprised of entities that were owned by the
countries media and banking monopolies and had not paid their tax dues. Filanbanco
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(Checa-Godoy 16) — one of the banks that went bankrupt in the late 1990s and which
was partly responsible for the Ecuadorian banking crisis — for instance, had major shares
in the Isaías media group and “allegedly owed US $661 million to the state” (WANIFRA
2) after collapsing. The State nationalized the entity because it had dues to the
government and had not paid its debt for years (Checa-Godoy 16).
While legally, they may not be as financially interlinked as before Correa became
president, the private media and the banking sector have indicated that the President is
“an obstacle to an open market and a threat to freedom of the press and expression (Ayala
9). Thus, given the constant confrontation between the media and the government, the
private sector in the country has created an opposition coalition, which includes the
media (Ayala 9).
Thus, it is widely accepted that the laws and policies put forth by the government
are limiting and “chill assertive reporting” (Hughes and Lawson 5). In fact, organizations
such as WANIFRA — World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers have
stated, “the personal attacks by the president have a chilling effect on the independent
press” (WANIFRA 4).
Thus, In Ecuador, Correa’s permanent campaign scheme has allowed him high
levels of public support, turning his government into a plebiscitary one and allowing him
to legislate the country over the heads of the country’s legislative body. Yet, Correa’s
permanent campaign strategy, which uses national chains, is assumed to affect press
freedom as he uses chain broadcasts to constantly criticize media. Yet, if there is a lack of
press freedom in the country, such has the potential to come from the private sector,
which has media interests, as much as it does from the government.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
HYPOTHESIS
As expanded in the previous chapter, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s
permanent campaigning strategy has been criticized to be an infringement on press
freedom in the country. To assess if this is true or not, this study analyzed Correa’s
method of permanent campaigning through media and how it could create a chilling
effect among the Ecuadorian press.
This study examined opinion column content from one of Ecuador’s major
newspapers, El Universo, for three-month periods in three separate years: 2007, 2009,
and 2012. This study compared variables levels of permanent campaigning through
mandated government broadcasts on all private and public channels also known as
national chains, and analyzed levels of negativity among opinion columns for all three
years. Two hypotheses follow.

H1: There was an increasing numbers of cadenas nacionales from the time
President Rafael Correa took office in 2007 up until 2012.

H2: There was an increased chilling effect among opinion columns in El
Universo, represented by a decrease in the negativity levels of the content of the
columns.
CONTENT ANALYSIS

37

Content analysis was the method chosen for this study. This method of analysis
was chosen because it is “the study of recorded human communications” (Babbie 330)
and allows for the “studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective and
quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables” (Wimmer and Dominick
141). Content analysis is also a “valuable tool in answering many mass media questions”
(Wimmer and Dominick 141) and is “particularly well suited to the study of
communications and to answering the classic question of communications research”
(Babbi 331). Such questions include the “who says what, to whom, why how and with
what effect” (Babbi 331)?
When it comes to media and mass communication, “some topics are more
appropriately addressed by content analysis” (Babbi 331). Thus, this method provides for
the evaluated content to be “selected according to explicit and consistently applied rules”
(Wimmer and Dominick 141). Content analysis “is limited to the examination of recorded
communications” (Babbi 342), thus, given that messages contained in the mass media are
“increasingly popular research topics in both the academic sector and the private sector”
(Wimmer and Dominick 141), this research method provides for an effective way of
observing data relating to media.
Content analysis is also an objective method of analyzing data given that “the
researcher’s personal idiosyncrasies should not enter into the findings” (Wimmer and
Dominick 141). Therefore, when used, content analysis should yield the same results if
another researcher were to perform the same research. While a perfectly created criterion
for choosing and coding the sample is non-existent, content analysis provides a clear and
replicable form of evaluation (Babbi 342).
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Furthermore, given that content analysis is a quantitative research method, it
“provides an accurate representation of a body of messages” (Wimmer and Dominick
141). This allows for precision in summarizing the results of the research. Content
analysis simplifies the standardized procedure of observance, and provides the researcher
with statistical tools that help in the interpretation of the analysis process and the results
of the research (Wimmer and Dominick 141).
Content analysis allows for the correction of errors by making it easier to repeat
portions of the analysis and “permits the study process occurring over a long time”
(Babbi 342). Hence, for a media analysis, this research method allows for the observance
and analysis for a period of months, even years.

SAMPLING
Cadenas nacionales — governmental programs used as service announcements
(Conaghan and de la Torre 276) — are one of the government’s most effective tools in
communicating with the electorate. Chains allow for the government to broadcast its
message over a multitude of channels on television and radio stations, reaching even the
most remote rural areas in the country. According to FUNDAMEDIOS, national chains
are often used as a medium of propaganda to popularize to the electorate the different
functions being carried out by the government. FUNDAMEDIOS, which is located in the
Ecuadorian capital of Quito, has stated that it “supports the development of democratic
media and the exercise of quality journalism” (FUNDAMEDIOS 4).
Throughout his presidency, Correa has used two different types of chains to
communicate with his electorate. The first type of chain is the one most commonly
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utilized as it is a mandated chain, meaning that whenever the government feels the need
to inform the public about something, it forces all media channels including privately
owned radio and television stations to tune into the government’s signal
(FUNDAMEDIOS 2). This is a service provided for the government by radio and
television stations free of charge (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). Thus, through
mandated chains, the government is able to reach out to a great number of people as its
signal gets broadcast in every possible channel in the country.
The other type of chains only uses the government’s media outlets to pass on the
message. For instance, from the start of his presidency, President Correa has used chains
called Sabatinas (broadcasted every Saturday), which are used to report the progress of
the government to the electorate (WANIFRA 4). These, however, are mostly only
broadcast through governmental owned or sponsored media, which comprise
approximately 20 radio and television broadcasting channels (FUNDAMEDIOS 1).
Given that there is no archive to check upon the time the government has used for
either type of chain since Correa took over as president, this research used the only
quantification available for the number of chains and minutes broadcasted. These
numbers are provided by the FUNDAMEDIOS Foundation and are available from the
beginning of Correa’s presidency in 2007 up until August of 2012 for mandated chains
only.
As aforementioned, in order to come to a conclusion regarding the existence of a
chilling effect among the Ecuadorian media, this research sampled media from 2007,
2009, and 2012. In order to objectively analyze and reach an equitable generalization as
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to the journalistic content of the Ecuadorian media, the research looked at opinion
column content of El Universo, the major newspaper in Ecuador’s most populous city,
Guayaquil, as its units of analysis. El Universo has had a daily distribution rate of
approximately 120,000 copies from 2002 to 2010 (Checa-Godoy 7). Given that Sundays
are when newspapers have their biggest audiences, the analysis looked at the Sunday
opinion columns for three months of each year: June, July, and August. These months
were chosen because August 2012 was the last month FUNDAMEDIOS provided
available numbers for governmental usage of national chains, making the analysis of
June, July, and August for each year simpler to accomplish.

MEASURES
Permanent Campaigning
In order to quantify rising or decreasing levels of permanent campaigning in
Ecuador, the study analyzed the number of mandated national chains — broadcasts by the
government on all privately and publicly owned broadcasting channels, forcing them to
tune in to the government’s broadcasting signal so the same signal plays on all radio and
television channels.
Given that there is no archive of these broadcasts, the study looked at quantified
numbers by FUNDAMEDIOS. The organization published a Special Report in 2013 on
the usage of governmental national chains in Ecuador titled “Use of National Chains:
Tools to contrasts dissident opinion.” In the document, FUNDAMEDIOS reports its own
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data as well as data from the ETHOS foundation, quantified the number and the minutes
used for mandated national chains from 2007 through August of 2012.
The Chilling Effect
The samples for the editorials analyzed were chosen from the El Universo
newspaper, which is Guayaquil’s largest, privately owned newspaper. The columns were
accessed through the newspaper’s website, www.eluniverso.com, from which the tab
Ediciones Anteriores (previous editions), led to the search of the columns. By isolating
newspaper issues by year and then month, the newspaper website showed a calendar view
that allowed choosing only Sunday. While the website did not provide PDF archives for
each issue, it provided a long list of all the written contents in the newspaper for each
day. The website then listed articles by the section in which they were published. The
criteria used for choosing articles to analyze were based on articles containing at least one
of the following ten words within their content:
Correa
Correa is the last name of the Ecuadorian president. When translated into Spanish, the
word means "belt," but articles containing the word were only chosen when used as the
president’s last name.
Presidente
In English, the word means president. All articles containing this word were chosen.

Ejecutivo
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In English, the word means executive, i.e. a country’s executive. Articles that used this
word in reference to the president of a country were used.
Estado
In English, the word means State. Similar to Spanish, the word can be used to refer to a
country, i.e. the State of Venezuela (El Estado Venezolano); or as a noun to describe the
condition of something, i.e. the state of nature or the gaseous state of water (el estado de
naturaleza o el estado gaseoso del agua). Only articles that used the word in reference to a
country were used.
PAÍS
PAÍS refers to President Rafael Correa’s political party, Alianza PAÍS — Patria Altiva I
Soberana (PAÍS Alliance — Proud and Sovereign Fatherland). In English, the word
directly translates to “country,” but only articles that contained the word in reference to
the president’s political party were used.
Revolución
Referent to Revolución Ciudadana (Citizens’ Revolution). This is President Rafael
Correa’s and his political coalition’s project of implementation of XXI Century Socialism
in Ecuador. In English, the word directly translates into “revolution,” but only articles
containing the word in reference to the Citizens’ Revolution were used.
Asamblea
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In English, the word means assembly. For purposes of the article, however, only words
referent to a form of legislative body were used. In Ecuador, the unicameral legislative
body is called Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly). Additionally, President Rafael
Correa’s agenda has called for an Asamblea Constituyente, or a Constituent Assembly to
draft a new constitution. This happened in 2008 after 80 percent of the Ecuadorian
electorate voted for its approval via referenda.
Constitución
In English, the word means Constitution. Only articles containing the word in reference
to a country’s constitution (written body of fundamental principles) were used.

Gobierno
In English, the word means government. All articles containing the word were used.

Dictador
In English, the word translates into “dictator.” All articles containing this word
were used. The context in which this word is used to discriminate articles referent to
government from those that are not, is that in early 2012, an opinion column by El
Universo’s columnist Emilio Palacio described the president as a dictator. The president
went on to sue the newspaper and the writer, winning defamatory damages of $40
million, while the writer and publishers of the newspaper were sentenced to three years in
prison. President Rafael Correa ultimately issued a pardon to the writer and publisher and
did not pursue the damages.
As per the established process of discriminating columns that were related to
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government though an article’s usage of at least one of the aforementioned 10 words,
under the link “Columnistas” (Columnists), each issue had the title and author of the
different columns published for that day. Therefore, one by one, each column was
checked for the usage of the ten words through the computer’s control/find function for
each word on the list.

CODING
In order to reach a conclusion about how El Universo newspaper refers to the
government and whether the privately owned media in Ecuador have indeed become a
form of movementism in the nation by converting themselves into part of the opposition,
I had to analyze the existence of a chilling effect among Ecuadorian privately owned
media.
This study examined the levels of negativity among opinion columns. A set of
standards was used in order to infer whether the articles refer to the government in a
positive, negative, or neutral manner. The articles were then coded to account for their
portrayal of government. The coding numbers ran from 1 to 5 indicating if opinion
articles were negative, slightly negative, neutral, slightly positive, or positive regarding
the government of Rafael Correa, his presidency, ideology, governmental figures, and/or
actions. An additional coding number, -1, was given to those articles that contained at
least one of the ten words, but were unrelated to government in Ecuador or elsewhere.
These were excluded from the final calculation of the mean and standard deviation of the
stories for each year in the sample.
When an article had at least one of the ten words, it was printed. At the end of
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each three-month period, all articles were numbered. After having printed the articles
from 2007, 2009, and 2012, all articles were read and given a code from 1-5 (from
negative to positive), and -1 (for columns that were not relevant to the government). The
coding standard works as follows.
Negative (1)
For a column to be coded negative it had to contain harsh criticism of the current
Ecuadorian government or the government's actions. The column had to contain criticism
of government in more than one place in the article (two or more paragraphs). The
column could be qualified as negative if the author insulted him/herself and/or described
himself as "bruto," "pelucón," “chuta” (stupid, rich, damn it — colloquial word usage
signifying insults — “pelucón” is a word dispersed by Correa to describe wealthy
individuals) in a sarcastic tone, referring to his or her lack of understanding or servile
manner towards the Ecuadorian government. For the article to have been coded in this
category, it needed to have overly used adoring language towards government, clearly
intended to be sarcasm. In order to identify sarcasm, insults and colloquial words meant
to signify insults are usually enclosed in exclamation marks. Additionally, the usage of
sarcasm and double-meaning words to convey negativity about the government i.e. “el
muy inteligente Presidente,” “the very intelligent President,” were also coded as negative.
For a column to be coded in this category, its author could have written a personal
attack against the government or government representative such as the president,
ministers, etc. Most of the time, in order to write deleteriously about a governmental
figure, the author of a column could have referred to representatives with the word “el” in
front of their last names i.e. “el Correa,” “el Patiño.” The author could have also used
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harsh language to attack government or governmental figures.
Slightly Negative (2)
For a column to have been coded as slightly negative, and to distinguish it from a
column that was coded as negative, there needed to have only been slight criticism of a
governmental action by the author. This means that while an author clearly disagreed
with a particular governmental action, he or she did not attack specific governmental
figures and did not use insults or sarcasm to prove his or her point. Therefore, even
thought the column clearly mentions a dissenting opinion from governmental action, it is
straightforward about its dissent with government and direct about the delivery of the
idea without recurring to the use of insults or sarcasm.
Neutral (3)
For a column to have ben coded as neutral, it needed to have mentioned facts
about the functioning of government but did not state dissent or approval. The column
needed to contain some sort of discussion about the Ecuadorian government’s actions
and/or situations that involve government, yet the author did not criticize, nor praise
government or governmental figures.
Another way that a column can be coded as neutral is if the author mentions
disagreement with some governmental actions, but also mentions agreeing with others in
the same article. Therefore, in order for a column to have been classified as a neutral
column, it needed to have a fair amount of positive as well as negative writing relating
the Ecuadorian government.
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Slightly Positive (4)
For a column to be coded as slightly positive it had to mention agreement with
governmental actions, yet, in it, the author did not seek to attack or offend the
government’s opposition. The author merely suggested approval of government, but did
not praise its governmental figures.
Positive (5)
For a column to be coded as positive, it had to strongly approve of the
government. Columns that contain phrases such as “buen trabajo,” (the good work) were
qualified as positive. Columns that contained words such as “nuestro” (ours), i.e.
“nuestro presidente,” “nuestra patria” (our president, our fatherland), were coded as
positive. Additionally, columns that retaliated an article or column by media in the
opposition (national or international) and criticized them with words such as “incapaz”
(incapable), when referring to the governmental opposition, were coded as positive.
Not related to Government (-1)
Although the measuring system for choosing the columns to be analyzed from the
sample allowed for a criteria that targeted content related to the Ecuadorian government,
some columns that contained at least one of the 10 words used for measurement
purposes, did not actually relate to the government and /or was irrelevant to governance
or government in Ecuador or elsewhere.
In order for a column to be coded as not being related to government, their
authors must not have referred to the Ecuadorian government, its actions, or ideology
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and/or must not have acknowledged the Ecuadorian government, its politics, or its
governmental figures in any way.

Analysis Plan
Results for the research proposed by this study are included in Chapter Four. First
an overview of the data is reported and analyzed, including the total number of cadenas
nacionales and the minutes used for them over time, as well as the total number of
opinion columns from El Universo that were examined. The total numbers for the coding
of each column are then averaged for each year (mean average). Both hypotheses were
analyzed to come to a conclusion of whether there exists a chilling effect inflicted by the
government, mostly through permanent campaigning, among Ecuadorian privately owned
media.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Permanent Campaigning and Press Freedom
While permanent campaigning from ‘pink tide,’ leftists governments in Latin
America may not be a new development, the possible increase of such may be a factor in
determining how a government is able to affect politics and the media in his or her
country. In the case of Rafael Correa the claim that his permanent campaigning scheme
has increased over the years is, in fact, true. By using data from FUNDAMEDIOS, I
came to the conclusion that Correa used 156 television and radio stations in 2007, to a
projected 237 in 2012 — even though there was a slight decrease (by 13) in the number
of chains used by the president from 2007 to 2008. This is a definite increase in the usage
of chains by the government over a period of five years. In fact, not only do the number
of chains increase, but also, the number of minutes used for such chains increase as
mandated national chains used 700 broadcasting minutes in 2007, to a projected 1,545
minutes in 2012. Even though the number of minutes used by chains was at an all-time
high in 2009, with 3,636, there is still a significant increase in the minutes from the
baseline year of 2007. Thus, as shown in Appendix III, there is definite evidence that
Correa’s permanent campaigning scheme, which uses national chains to constantly appeal
to the Ecuadorian electorate, has increased in number and in minutes from 2007 to 2012,
lending support for the first hypothesis.
Inversely, hypothesis 2 was not supported, which was that in order to avoid
trouble with the government and being personally called out by the president of the
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country, Ecuadorian journalists claim that they must self-censure the negative
information they publish about the government and this creates a chilling effect, was not
supported by the data. In fact, of the political columns, quantified and averaged by each
year (See Appendix Table 3 and 4), there is no definitive evidence of a chilling effect. If a
chilling effect had occurred, one would have expected to find that the score for the stories
would have become more positive, on average, both after the passing of the new
constitution and Correa’s reelection in 2009, as well as after the president sued both the
journalists who wrote El Gran Hermano and the newspaper El Universo.
Furthermore, the average of negativity went from 1.74 in average in 2007; to 1.33
in 2009; to 1.44 in 2012. This means that the columns published by El Universo have
been negative over time. Thus, the data suggest that, on average, column content show
the opposite effect than what the chilling hypothesis suggests as the negativity levels in
such columns has increased.
Counting those that are explicitly political columns, there is a shift to the columns
being more negative over time, disproving the chilling effect hypothesis of media being
“unable” to question the President Correa and/or criticize him and his government. The
data don’t support the chilling effect. In fact, the non-government media are becoming
more negative and more strident in terms of criticism. This happens because, as compared
to the baseline, which is 2007, the average of each year tends to be negative, never
returning to its original base number.
Thus, if the chilling hypothesis were to be true, it would be expected that the
score be well above 2 or 3 in average for each year, suggesting more positive content.
However, the averages are below where they were in the 2007 baseline — 1.74 — with
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1.33 in 2009 and 1.44 in 2012. Even though in 2012 is a bit higher than in 2009, the
numbers never return to base number and remain considerably lower.
In fact, in addition to the calculation of the mean average, which is used as a
measure of the central tendency of the classifications of the columns per year, the
standard deviation was calculated for each year’s totals. The standard deviation in the
baseline year of 2007 was 0.85, a slight increase in 2009 with 0.96, and a decrease in
2012 with 0.51. Thus, while there are no anomalies in the standard deviation numbers for
each year, through the decrease in the number from 2012, I concluded that while the
columns are getting more critical of the government over time, they are also more similar
in their classification at the same time.
Therefore, while a permanent campaign exists and the president has used his
means of permanent campaign to criticize private media and its journalists, there is no
evidence of a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian private media as it continues to
publish increasingly negative content.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Overview and General Discussion
The interruption of regular programing among radio and television stations, so
that the government’s signal can be broadcasted nationwide is considered by
FUNDAMEDIOS as a breach on freedom of the press, because it precludes coverage of
events by any other entity than the government, which may or may not cover events
fairly. Private media entities in Ecuador argue that the public exposure of the president’s
antagonism as he “points to the corruption and mediocrity of the mass media” (Rettberg
and Rincón 80) corrode press freedoms and democracy in the country. The mass media,
therefore, argue that they are the sole “defenders of the democratic liberties and the only
ones that can create a front of opposition to the supposed authoritarianism of the
Government” (Rettberg and Rincón 80).
FUNDAMEDIOS, which agrees with the mass media argument, uses the 29th
Article of the Reformatory Law to the Television and Radio Broadcasting law to make
the argument that by overusing national chains — which are also used to criticize mass
media — the government is acting against the laws it enacted. The article in the law states
that governmental transmissions should take place during a compatible time with the
schedules of television and radio broadcasting stations, unless in case of emergency,
which must be constitutionally declared. According to FUNDAMEDIOS, the government
is acting against its laws as the national chains often cut into news broadcasts for
illegitimate reasons. FUNDAMEDIOS states that the Ecuadorian government uses chain
broadcasts to “correct” journalists’ statements and to defend its positions and political
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agenda. Therefore, given the constant criticism of the media and journalistic coverage
within the content of national chains, FUNDAMEDIOS maintains that there is an
increasing lack of press freedom as print and broadcast journalists become more prone to
self-censoring out of fear of being publically accused as corrupt by the government
(FUNDAMEDIOS 5). Thus, the mass media, supported by FUNDMEDIOS, state that the
president’s permanent campaigning strategies, which include constant criticism of the
private media, have resulted in the expansion of a chilling effect (WANIFRA 4). Not only
that, but international actors such as Polity and Reporters Without Borders have criticized
the Ecuadorian Government for its lack of press freedom, alleging that their indexes,
which do not provide analysis of content actually published — point to that conclusion.
Additionally, FUNDAMEDIOS argues that the government forces the Ecuadorian
pubic to obtain its information from a single source, the government, and qualifies the
practice as anti-democratic as it has the potential to undermine the press freedom of each
station by intervening and cutting into their broadcasting time and space.
FUNDAMEDIOS makes the argument that if the chain minutes continue to increase and
the government increasingly continues to obligate broadcasting stations to broadcast its
message, then private stations run the risk of having to broadcast the government’s
message on a permanent basis.
Yet, even recognized by FUNDAMEDIOS itself, under the premise of democratic
discourse, it is in the public’s interest that government and its authorities give the public a
regular account of their actions. In fact, the Inter-American Court of Human rights has
established that it is the government’s duty to inform the public of its actions for which
the use of mass communication (including private media forms) is necessary.
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Nonetheless, the imperative measure of freedom of the press is based upon a
chilling effect and whether or not private media entities and journalists that work for such
self censure themselves in order to prevent trouble with the government or with the
public that is likely to support the government.
Through the measures explained in the above chapters, the levels of negativity
were measured for opinion columns Ecuador’s most popular privately owned newspaper
for three years: 2007, 2009, and 2012. For each year, political columns from each Sunday
in June, July and August were analyzed. It was found that over time, there is no
contingent chilling effect as columns have rising levels of negativity instead of rising
levels of positive rhetoric among them.
This means that although many organizations and media entities assert a chilling
effect and a decline in press freedom in the country, their published rhetoric in opinion
columns actually proves otherwise.
Thus, my conclusions contradict the general understanding of press freedom in
terms of the broader literature on democracy. While it is clear that Correa used his
permanent campaign to let loose on media and verbally attack journalists and journalistic
entities, the numbers calculated through content analysis do not support the theory that
these attacks actually result in a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian press.
This is a unique finding in the sense that indexes of press freedom such as
Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, have a tendency to not analyze the actual
content published or broadcasted by the press, to instead base their analysis on interviews
with journalists, laws enacted by governments, or other actions taken by a governments
that can be construed as posing a threat to press freedom. In fact, for “pink tide,” leftist
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governments in Latin America such as Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, the press
freedom scores in such indexes has drastically decreased since presidents took to national
chains to criticize media.
Thus, given that the content analysis provides an inverse result than what was
expected, I can also conclude that major democracy and press freedom indexes are
lacking in analysis for their conclusions. Given that content analysis showed that public
criticism of media does not result in a chilling effect in the case of Ecuador and its major
newspaper El Universo, the popular claim that pink tide regimes have become illiberal
democracies that restrict press freedom, might also prove to be invalid if such analysis
was done in those countries.

IMPLICATIONS
The study aimed to provide a broader overview of how the columns and
columnists portray the government in order to disseminate whether or not a chilling effect
exist in Ecuador. It would have been ideal to overview more than one newspaper,
especially El Comercio, Quito’s (the Ecuadorian capital) largest privately owned
newspaper and one of the largest in the country. However, due to its archiving system, it
was impossible to retrieve the complete data necessary to make the analysis for the years
2009 and 2012. Given that the analysis could not be carried out with only data from 2006,
the overall analysis only focuses on data from El Universo instead.
It would be ideal to analyze columns from more than one newspaper in order to
have a better idea of the existence of a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian media.
Because of time constraints and a lack of resources, I was unable to analyze the opinion
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columns of other newspapers. It would be interesting not only to access the archives to
analyze the existence of a chilling effect over time, but also to compare different
mediums to each other. An analysis between public and privately owned media or media
printed and broadcasted in different regions of the country would be ideal.
Not only that, but a more thorough analysis would improve the statistical
significance of the results. For instance, if replicated, this study should look to analyze
more than three years, and look at all Sundays for the entire duration of the presidency of
Rafael Correa and a few years before so as to have a measure and base for comparison.
Likewise, it would be essential for the study to have more validity if for the
content analyzed; the methods also included inter-coder reliability. Through that, there
can be a more accurate depiction of the actual analysis of the data and more reliable and
replicable results.
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APENDIX I
Ecuadorian Government Ownership of Media
The following are data of the governmental media in Ecuador. As stated in the
text, when President Rafael Correa took office in 2007; he looked to re-establish the
media ownership system in Ecuador. Thus, from the beginning of his mandate the
government seized private media entities that were in debt with the government, created
new media, and administered other media.

Media seized by the state
*El Telégrafo
GamaTV
TC Televisión
Cable Noticias
Cable Deportes
Radio Universal
ArthurOh
Carrousel
Radio Super K 800
La Onda Magazine
El Agro
Valles
Samborondón

Public Media
EcuadorTV
Radio Pública del Ecuador
El Telégrafo
PP El Verdadero

State-run Media
El Ciudadano (print and digital)
Radio de la Asamblea Nacional
ANDES Ecuadorian News Agency

Data obtained from WANIFRA’s Report on Press Freedom in Ecuador. January 2012.
* Seized by the government before Correa was elected as president.
APENDIX II
Expectations for first hypothesis
The first hypothesis of this study questions the existence of the permanent
campaign in Ecuador through the usage of national chains. Given the literature retrieved
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and reviewed, I hypothesized that there was a prevalent permanent campaign in Ecuador
and it existed through increasing numbers of national chains during President Rafael
Correa’s tenure as mandatary. Thus, the expectation for my hypothesis was that over
time, from 2007 to 2012, there would be a constant increase in the number of chains and
they would have a steady presence throughout the President’s tenure.

Permanent Campaigning National Chains
MORE CHAINS

LESS CHAINS

2007

2009

2012

APPENDIX III
Measures of permanent campaign
In the literature review, it was stated that a reliable measure of permanent
campaigning would be the number of national chains that the Correa and his government
had used throughout his tenure as president. Although two types of chains have been used
over the years, the first imposed by the government on all public and private broadcasting
channels and the second represented by weekly chains broadcasted on the state-owned
and state-sponsored television and radio stations only.
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The following table provides data of the number of imposed chains the president
used from 2007. All data were obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS, which provided numbers
of national chains up until August 2012.

Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
*2012
*Total
**2012
**Total

Television Chains Radio Chains Total Chains (Television and Radio) Total Broadcast Minutes
73
95
275
152
264
126
985
189
1048

83
48
58
71
87
32
379
48
395

156
143
333
223
351
158
1365
237
1443

700
1191
3636
2110
2645
1030
11793
1545
11827

Data obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS’ Special Report on the Usage of Governmental
National Chains in Ecuador.
*2012 data only calculated from January through August of that year.
**Projected number of chains for the entire duration of 2012
Given that the data only provided partial data for 2012, I calculated a projected
number of chains that would represent the trends of chain usage by the government for
the duration of the entire year.

Year Television Chains Radio Chains Total Chains (Television and Radio) Total Broadcast Minutes
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
**2012
**Total

73
95
275
152
264
189
1048

83
48
58
71
87
48
395

156
143
333
223
351
237
1443
60

700
1191
3636
2110
2645
1545
11827

Data obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS’ Special Report on the Usage of Governmental
National Chains in Ecuador.
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APPENDIX IV
Number of Chains reported to have been against opposing media/journalists
As stated within the text, Correa has used national chain broadcasts to let loose on
attacks on journalists and media entities that have been critical of him and his mandate.
The following table highlights the number of national chains used by the president to
specifically attack journalists or media entities from the time that he came into power as
president.

Year
Chains

2008

2009
2

2010
3

2011
4

2012
20

20

Data obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS’ Special Report on the Usage of Governmental
National Chains in Ecuador.

Chains agaist media
25
20
15
10
5
0
2008

2009

2010

2011
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As the chart above shows, there is a sharp increase in the number of chains used
solely for the purpose of criticizing or “correcting” claims made by the private media.
From 2010 to 2011 the government increased the number of chains against the media by
16 (from 4 to 20), and maintained the 2011 number of chains for 2012.
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APPENDIX IV
Expectation for second hypothesis
Given that through the first hypothesis, it was found that a permanent campaign
on behalf of Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa is prevalent through steady numbers
(and minute usage) of national chains. Additionally, from the beginning of his tenure as
President in 2007, there has been an increase in the number of chains used to attack
journalists and media. This led me to the hypothesis that over time, media would be
likely to publish more positive content about the government and the President. Given
that media entities and journalist are not likely to want to end up being criticized by the
Correa on a national platform, they would be prone to publishing less negative content
about him. Thus, the expectation for the second hypothesis were that over time, the
columns from El Universo would refer more positively about the Ecuadorian government
and Correa.

Series 1
MORE POSITIVE

MORE NEGATIVE

2007

2009

63

2012

APPENDIX VI
TABLE 1: Coding
The method of analysis for this thesis was content analysis. The following table is
a depiction of the coding of El Universo opinion columns for all three years analyzed —
Three months per year: June, July and August. The chart shows the date in which each
opinion column was published, its title and coding or classification number (the lower the
number, the more negative it is). Data from 2009 forward also contain the name of the
opinion column’s author. These data were unavailable for 2007.
2007
Number

June
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Number
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Title
3
3
3
10
10
17
24
24
24

Otra comisión
Los problemas de la altura
Emigrantes en Estados Unidos
Patihorror
Recuerdo de la Asamblea
Rosanna y Alexis
Trampita
Paranoia
¿Habrá reforma tributaria?

July

Title
1
1
8
8
8
8
15
15
15
22
22
29
29
29
29

Mangajo
Metodología inicial
Miedo
El maestro y las reglas
La esquina del idioma
Mindo, cinco años después
Patifiesta
Grabaciones, filmaciones, prohibiciones
Rendición de cuentas
El de antes
El homenaje a Alfonso
Un instante de silencio
A la der…
Una carta para Rafael
Suben precios
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Classification
2
1
3
1
1
1
2
1
2

Classification
1
2
1
1
-1
-1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
3

Number
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

August
5
5
5
5
12
12
12
19
19
19
26
36
26

Title

Classification

El himno
Cheerleaders
Es difícil ser columnista
Puerto Morona
La foto
5—5—5
El costo del dinero
Las ofertas
Bronca
Disolverán el Congreso
El migrante emigrado
Obstáculos
Socialismo del siglo XXI

1
1
3
3
1
2
3
3
3
2
1
3
3

2009

June

Title

Author

7 El poder y el miedo
7 Chamanes y 'doras'
7 Tu Voz
7 Nacionalismo metodológico
14 Sacrilegio
14 Los comicios andinos
14 ¡Mucho es el Correa!
21 Desafío comercial
21 Sysan Boyle y la envoltura
21 Horrores y errores
21 Silencio y poder
21 Brothers & Co.
28 San Vicente, Ecuador, Antigua
28 La pelea sigue
28 Las lecciones de Irán
28 La revolución humanizada

Francisco Febres Cordero
Fernando Coronel
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Fernando Fougéres
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
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Classification
1
1
1
3
1
4
1
3
3
1
2
1
3
1
-1
1

July

Title

Author

5 Conferencia Magistral
5 Me da pena
5 La Democracia, un bien público regional
5 Ventajas de la involución
12 Tracalada de valientes
12 Las relacioned con Colombia
12 Adivinanzas
19 Otra vez premiado
19 Shh… secreto
19 Ramon Espinel, ministro de Agricultura
19 El milagroso
26 ¡Que callen ellos!
26 Caos en la ciudad
26 El tiempo corre
26 Centrarse en lo fundamental
August
2
2
2
2
9
9
9
9
16
16
16
16
16
16
23
23
23
30
30
30
30
30

Title

Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Francisco Febres Cordero
Vianna Maino
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Author

Capitalismo y socialismo
Lenin, despierta
Conflictos entre países bolivarianos
Sin respiro
Desabastecimiento
La hora de los locos
El discurso
El aprendizaje
Salarios justos
Los 'contreras'
Dos demandas
Precios y agricultura
Los Comités
La esquina del idioma
Compás de espera
7 esperan
Evidencias silenciosas
Caridad en la verdad
Enamorada de mi maestro
Autogolpe
Unasur
La ausencia

Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Bernard Fougéres
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Piedad Villaviciencio Bellolio
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Bernard Fougéres
Emilio Palacio
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
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Classification
2
1
-1
1
1
2
2
2
1
4
1
1
-1
1
1
Classification
-1
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
2
3
1
4
1
-1
2
1
2
-1
-1
1
2
1

2012

Number

June

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Number
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Title

Author

3 ¿Burbuja? ¿Sobreendeudamiento?
3 Las tarjetas
3 Más sobre semillas y variedades
10 Personas jurídicas y responsabilidad penal
10 Contra Colombia
10 Desigualdades territoriales
17 Buitres
17 Ley del hielo
24 Retornan controles
24 Una foto
24 Un panorama sombrío

July

Title

Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Xavier Zavala Egas
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega

Author

1 Wen Jiabao en Sudamérica
1 El club de los perseguidos
1 Confianza en el futuro
8 Dar para recibir
8 Happy birthday, Julian
8 Carros
8 Los mudos
8 Realineamientos Sudamericanos
15 Ecuador quiere colocar bonos
15 El pirata del Guayas
15 La batalla perdida
22 ¿Qué pretendemos con Irán?
22 Diagnóstico Taurino
22 Funcionarios del Estado
29 ¡Despacito!
29 Elogio de la locura
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Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Daniela Trujillo
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Cecilia Ansaldo Briones
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Cecilia Ansaldo Briones
Francisco Febres Cordero
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Francisco Febres Cordero
Mauricio Gándara Gallegos

Classification
2
1
2
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
1
-1

Classification
-1
1
2
-1
2
-1
1
-1
1
-1
1
2
2
2
1
1

Number
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

August

Title

Author

5 Novedades en el Golfo
5 Las Firmas
5 Confrontación y desarollo económico
12 Mercosur no nos conviene
12 Ciudad mínima
12 Me aburren las carreteras
19 Control de cambios
19 Regreso del Chucky Seven
26 El imposible aprendizaje
26 Me robaron la capacidad de elegir

Classification

Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Cecilia Ansaldo Briones
Manuel Chiriboga Vega
Walter Spurrier Baquerizo
Francisco Febres Cordero
Francisco Febres Cordero
Manuel Chiriboga Vega

2
1
-1
2
-1
2
2
1
1
2

TABLE 2: AVERAGE
The following table represents the average number of the column coding
classifications for each year. The mean average for each year was quantified after
removing the columns coded as -1 from the sample. Because such columns were not
related to the newspaper’s depiction of the government, their classification made them
invalid for the analysis.

Year
AVERAGE
ST. DEV

2007

2009
1.74
0.85

2012
1.33
0.96

1.44
0.51

As shown in the table above and the chart below, the average of the classifications
of the columns provides further understanding in how the second hypothesis was not
valid. In fact, the results oppose the expectation of the hypothesis as they show a
continual increase in negativity of columns. While the average for 2012 is slightly less
negative than in 2009, the difference does not represent a sufficient change to be
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considered not negative, especially since it is still below the 2007 average.
The standard deviation was also calculated for each year, showing that the sample
gets closer together in average over time.
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